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NOTES
"ONE NATION UNDER GOD," INDEED: THE
NINTH CIRCUIT'S PROBLEMATIC
DECISION TO CHANGE OUR PLEDGE OF
ALLEGIANCE
TARA P. BEGLIN1
The Pledge of Allegiance
"I Pledge Allegiance to the Flag
Of the United States of America
And to the Republic For Which It Stands,
One Nation Under God,
Indivisible,
With Liberty and Justice For All." 2
Candidate for LL.M. in Health Law, St. Louis University School of Law, May 2006;
J.D., St. John's University School of Law, June 2005; B.A. Economics and Psychology,
Manhattan College, June 2003. The author would like to thank her husband, her parents,
and her sisters and brother for all of their love and support, and the staff of the Journal of
Legal Commentary for all of their hard work.
2 4 U.S.C. § 4 (1998).
129
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:1
INTRODUCTION
This Note discusses the Ninth Circuit's decision in Newdow v.
U.S. Congress,3 taking the position that the court erred in
holding that the Elk Grove School District's policy of reciting the
Pledge of Allegiance violated the First Amendment
Establishment Clause. Part II provides relevant background
information, including an analysis of the Newdow decision and a
historical and jurisprudential discussion of the Pledge of
Allegiance. Part III discusses the First Amendment
Establishment Clause, the theories that have been applied to
interpret the Establishment Clause, and the three tests the
Supreme Court has used in analyzing the Establishment Clause.
Part IV is devoted to analyzing the Newdow case under sound
Constitutional principles, suggesting that, if it would not have
failed on the issue of standing, 4 the Supreme Court would have
reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. Part V presents the
conclusion of this Note.
I. PRELIMINARY INFORMATION
A. Newdow v. U.S. Congress
The Supreme Court granted Michael Newdow's ("Newdow")
petition for certiorari on October 14, 2003, thereby agreeing to
review the Ninth Circuit's decision of this very complicated case. 5
On behalf of his nine year old daughter, Newdow, an atheist,
brought suit against the school district she attends, the school
district she previously attended, the United States Congress, and
3 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
4 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2305 (2004) (stating that
Newdow lacked standing because his standing derived entirely from his relationship with
his daughter).
5 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (2003) (granting writ of
certiorari); see also Rob Boston, One Nation Indivisible? "Under God" Case at Supreme
Court Tests Nation's Commitment to Church-State Separation, Religious Pluralism,
CHURCH & STATE, Dec. 1, 2003, at 6 (discussing pending Newdow case); Philip J. Nichols,
Two Troubling Words In Thirty-One: "I Pledge" 84 B.U. L. REV. 799 (2004) (declaring that
Supreme Court will decide whether public school teachers "routinely flout the
Establishment Clause when they lead their students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance").
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the President of the United States.6 Newdow claimed that his
daughter suffered injury as a result of having to "watch and
listen as her state-employed teacher in her state-run school [led]
her classmates in a ritual proclaiming that there is a God, and
that our's [sic] is 'one nation under God."'7
More specifically, Newdow's complaint contested the
constitutionality of (1) the 1954 Act 8 that amended the Pledge to
include the phrase "under God," (2) the California statute
requiring the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag
once a day in schools, and (3) the school district's policy of
mandating willing students to recite the Pledge under their
teacher's direction. 9 Newdow sought to have the court order both
the President and Congress to remove the words "under God"
from the Pledge.lO However, the court held that the President
was not a proper defendant in an action disputing the
constitutionality of a federal statute.11 In addition, under the
Speech and Debate Clause,12 federal courts do not have
6 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 600-02 (presenting facts of case); Ronald R. Garet,
Foundations Church Autonomy: Commentary: Three Concepts of Church Autonomy, 2004
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1349, 1359 (2004) (discussing Newdow case); see also Lisa Shaw Roy, The
Establishment Clause and the Concept of Inclusion, 83 OR. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (stating
facts of Newdow).
7 Newdow, 292 F.3d at 601; see Douglas W. Kmiec, Oh God! Can I Say That In
Public?, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 307, 310-11 (2003) (outlining Ninth
Circuit case).
8 83 P.L. 396 (1954) (amending Pledge to include the words "under God").
9 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 601 (outlining Newdow's complaint); see also County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (discussing addition to Pledge). See
generally Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984) (stating that "Pledge [of Allegiance]
is recited by many thousands of public school children" each year).
10 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 601 (stating relief sought); Charles J. Russo, The
Supreme Court and Pledge of Allegiance: Does God Still Have a Place in American
Schools?, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 301, 327 (2004) (discussing Newdow's case and what the
Court will be analyzing); Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion
Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 66 (2004) (explaining Court's analysis of the phrase
"under God").
11 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 601 (disqualifying the President as an appropriate
defendant); Franklin v. Mass.achusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 803 (1992), (explaining the court
has no jurisdiction to enjoin President in performance of his official duties) (quoting
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 501 (1866)); Bates v. Taylor, 87 Tenn. 319, 331 (1888)
(stating neither Congress nor President "can be restrained in its action by the judicial
department").
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (stating that legislative immunity created by clause
performs an important function in representative government); see Eastland v. U.S.
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975) (explaining that the Clause provides
protection against civil actions, criminal actions and actions brought by private
individuals); see also Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
that because of art. I, § 6, cl. 1, federal courts lack jurisdiction to issue orders directing
Congress to enact or amend legislation).
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jurisdiction to order Congress to amend or enact legislation.13
The court also rejected Newdow's argument that Congress'
protection by operation of the Speech and Debate Clause was
vitiated because the enactment of the 1954 Act violated the
Establishment Clause.14
Newdow was able to successfully overcome certain standing
issues even though he lacks full custody of his daughter.15 The
court found that as a parent, Newdow had standing to challenge
any exercise interfering with his right to coordinate the religious
instruction of his daughter.16 Although Newdow was found to
have standing to dispute the policy of the school district that his
daughter currently attends, 17 he was found not to have standing
regarding the school district that his daughter previously
attended.1 In order to have proper standing to sue, the court
explained, a plaintiff must prove that "(1) it has suffered an
'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and
(3) it is likely, 'as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision."19 Although the
Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's reasoning and
13 See Newdow, 292 F.3d. at 602 (holding that this Court lacks jurisdiction over
Congress); see also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503 (stating that legislature should be protected
from the burden of defending themselves in litigation); Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the
Motives of Government Decision Makers: A Subpoena For Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REV.
879, 901 (1985) (noting that legislative immunity derives from Speech or Debate Clause of
the Constitution).
14 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 602 (addressing jurisdictional issues); see also Linda P.
McKenzie, Note, The Pledge of Allegiance: One Nation Under God?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 379,
379-80 (2004) (explaining Ninth Circuit's holding on Newdow's challenge to the
constitutionality of 1954 Act); Lisa Trinh, Note and Comment, Newdow v. U.S. Congress:
One Nation Indivisible, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 807, 816 (2003) (discussing Ninth Circuit's
rationale in holding that the 1954 Act failed the Lemon test because legislative intent was
contrary to Establishment Clause's prohibition of governmental endorsement of any
religion over another).
15 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 602-04 (analyzing standing issue).
16 See id. at 603 (providing that Newdow has standing).
17 See id. at 602 (explaining basis for Newdow's standing).
18 Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing standing in
claims against Newdow's daughter's previous school district).
19 Id. at 602 (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, 528 U.S. 167,
180-81 (2000)); see McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003) (noting
that standing requirements are rooted in limitations on judicial power in Article III of the
Constitution); Gilbert J. Ginsburg & Janine S. Benton, A Review of Recent Decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Article: One Year Later:
Affirmative Action in Federal Government Contracting After Adarand, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1903, 1948 n.250 (1996) (citing Bras v. California P.U.C., 59 F.3d 869, 872 (1995)).
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ultimately found that Newdow lacked standing to bring this suit
on behalf of his daughter, 20 an analysis of the lower court's
opinion is beneficial to develop a firm understanding of the issues
at hand.
With regards to the Establishment Clause challenge, the Ninth
Circuit applied the three tests the Supreme Court has
traditionally applied to Establishment Clause cases: the three-
prong Lemon v. Kurtzman2l test, the "endorsement" test adopted
in Lynch v. Donnelly,22 and the "coercion" test relied upon in Lee
v. Weisman.23 Under these tests, the Ninth Circuit found that the
legislative intent behind the 1954 Act was the promotion of
religion as a means of distinguishing the United States from
Communist nations. 24 Specifically, the application of the
endorsement test led the court to conclude that the Pledge is "an
impermissible government endorsement of religion because it
sends a message to unbelievers that they are not full members of
the community, but are instead 'outsiders."' 25  The court
20 See Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on Constitutional
Secularism, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1005, 1029 n.9 (2004) (noting Court's reasoning for
determining a lack of standing existed); see also Todd Collins, Lost in the Forest of the
Establishment Clause: Elk Grove v. Newdow, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 25 (2004)
(discussing assertion by Elk Grove that Newdow lacked standing because he did not have
custody of his daughter); McKenzie, supra note 14, at 414 n.44 (citing United States brief
for government argument that Newdow lacked standing on behalf of his daughter).
21 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see Dena S. Davis, Religious Clubs in the Public Schools: What
Happened After Mergens?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 225, 239 n.13 (2000) (listing three prongs
required under Lemon); see also Jeffrey D. Williams, Humphrey v. Lane: The Ohio
Constitution's David Slays the Goliath of Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 34 AKRON L. REV. 919, 946 n.22 (2001) (stating that Lemon
Court established three prong test to determine if Establishment Clause has been
violated).
22 465 U.S. 668 (1984); see Roy, supra note 6, at 16 (stating that Justice O'Connor
included her endorsement test in the concurring opinion); see also Jeremy Speich, Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe: Mapping the Future of Student-Led, Student-
Initiated Prayer in Public Schools, 65 ALB. L. REV. 271, 276 (2001) (noting that some find
endorsement test more useful than three prong Lemon test).
23 505 U.S. 577 (1992); see Emilie Kraft Bindon, Entangled Choices: Selecting
Chaplains for the United States Armed Forces, 56 ALA. L. REV. 247, 265 (2004) (stating
that coercion test was first articulated by Justice Kennedy in County of Allegheny v.
A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573 (1989)); see also Collins, supra note 20, at 11 (explaining use of
coercion test in Lee).
24 See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d. 597, 610 (9th Cir. 2002) (analyzing
legislative history of Act); Collins, supra note 20, at 22 (stating that the Act alienated all
unbelievers); Paul Andonian, Note, One Nation, Without God? A Note on the Ninth
Circuit's Decision in Newdow v. Unites States Congress Holding that Reciting the Pledge
of Allegiance in Public Schools Violates the Establishment Clause and Therefore
Unconstitutional, 33 Sw. U. L. REV. 119, 132 (2003) (explaining court's findings of coercive
effect of pledge on school children).
25 Newdow, 292 F.3d. at 608 (applying endorsement test).
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ultimately held that the 1954 Act amending the Pledge of
Allegiance, the Elk Grove School District's policy, and the
ensuing recitation of the Pledge, violates the Establishment
Clause. 26
In his dissent, Judge Fernandez did not apply the religion
clause tests, but instead focused on the purpose of both the
religion clauses and the Pledge of Allegiance. 27 He noted that the
religion clauses were created to "avoid discrimination," not to
"drive religious expression out of public thought."28 Moreover,
Judge Fernandez stressed the lack of substantial danger in using
phrases mentioning "God," noting that they exist throughout
American culture and will continue, as they have since 1791,29 to
be harmless. 30 In addition, Judge Fernandez commented on the
conflict between those who want to get rid of religious phrases
and those who want to retain them, noting that the Constitution
is "a practical and balanced charter for the just governance of a
free people in a vast territory."31 The dissent further highlighted
the embellished nature of Newdow's alleged injury in his
insistence that the danger of "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance is "so miniscule as to be de minimis."32
In Newdow v. U.S. Congress (Newdow I1),33 the Ninth Circuit
panel refined its decision and refused to rehear the case en
banc.34 In amending its decision, the court did not examine the
constitutionality of the federal 1954 Act because it noted that in
holding only the school district policy constitutional, the District
26 See id. at 612 (stating holding of case); Collins, supra note 20, at 2 (explaining that
Act violates Establishment Clause); Andonian, supra note 24, at 133 (noting that Act
failed Lemon test, and therefore was unconstitutional).
27 See Newdow, 292 F.3d. at 613 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
application of tests).
28 See id. at 613.
29 See id. at 614 (commenting that "under God" has been used since 1791); Jacob
Pugh, Wedge of Allegiance: Is the Newdow Case a Portent of Religious Intolerance?, 63 OR.
ST. B. BULL. 15, 16 (2003) (asserting that there is little risk from phrases such as "under
God"); Trinh, supra note 14, at 818 (labeling danger to society from use of "God" as de
minimis).
30 See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d. 597, 614 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (9th
Cir. 2002) (defending "God" phrases as harmless).
31 See id. at 614.
32 See id. at 613.
33 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) (hereinafter Newdow 11).
34 See id. at 469 (stating order of case); Collins, supra note 20, at 23 (noting that
judicial panel denied hearing case en banc); Andonian, supra note 24, at 125 (clarifying
that motions for rehearing were denied).
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Court had not ruled on the broader federal issue.35 However, the
panel applied only the coercion test in finding that the school
district's policy of reciting the Pledge defied the Establishment
Clause. 36 Although the Ninth Circuit panel acknowledged prior
statements by the Supreme Court regarding the Pledge, the
majority of the panel found that Court has never ruled on the
permissibility of the Pledge in either of these instances. 37 As a
result of the holding of Newdow II, the Elk Grove School District
filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. 38
The Newdow II decision contained a dissent by both Circuit
Judges McKeown and O'Scannlain. While Judge McKeown's
dissent expressed the need for an en banc review, 39 Judge
O'Scannlain, on the other hand, referred to the court's decision as
a "serious mistake" on multiple fronts.40 Specifically, Judge
O'Scannlain expressed that the rehearing of Newdow should
have been en banc due to its overwhelmingly improper holding. 41
This dissent emphasized that a recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance "cannot possibly be an 'establishment of religion'
under any reasonable interpretation of the Constitution."42
35 See Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 467-70 (discussing Newdow), see also Andonian, supra
note 24, at 119-20 (stating that "[N]inth Circuit's original decision essentially deemed the
Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional, igniting controversy among legal scholars and
citizens across the United States. Then, upon realizing its mistake, the Ninth Circuit
amended their decision removing reference to and analysis of the 1954 Act"); cf. Sherman
v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992) (conflicting with
Ninth Circuit's original decision).
36 See Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 466-70 (discussing holding of the case), see also
Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d. 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that with respect to
Lemon, coercion, and endorsement tests, the Court was "free to apply any or all of the
three tests, and to invalidate any measure that fails any one of them"); cf. Andonian,
supra note 24, at 129-30 (observing that "of the three tests used to analyze challenges to
the Establishment Clause, the coercion test is applied the least frequently; this is because
of the high bar it sets").
37 See Newdow II, 328 F.3d at 466-70 (discussing Supreme Court dicta); see also John
E. Thompson, Note, What's the Big Deal? The Unconstitutionality of God in the Pledge of
Allegiance, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563, 569-71 (2003) (analyzing Newdow II).
38 See Thompson, supra note 37, at 571 (commenting on Elk Grove School District's
response to Ninth Circuit panel's holding).
39 See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) (Newdow 1H)
(O'Scannilain, J., dissenting) (discussing several reasons the Court should have reheard
Newdow en banc).
40 See id. (disagreeing with majority).
41 See id. (expressing need for en banc hearing).
42 Id.
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B. The Pledge of Allegiance
The original Pledge of Allegiance was written by Francis
Bellamy.43 Bellamy, a socialist, intended for the Pledge to be a
"creed that would ... remind those who recited it that the state
was to prevail over the individual or any competing source of
authority, whether church or family."44 The Pledge of Allegiance
was officially codified in 1942 by Congress and the relevant
excerpt was phrased "one Nation indivisible."45 The adoption of
the Pledge manifested Congress' desire to express the
government's disdain for improper government expansion and
usurpation of purely civil liberties. 46
The current version of the Pledge of Allegiance is the result of
a Congressional addition.47 In June, 1954 Congress enacted an
amendment which added the phrase "under God" following the
phrase "one Nation."48 "Under God" was added to acknowledge
that "[Americans] and [United States] Government are
dependent upon the moral directions of the Creator."49 More
specifically, the change was made during the United States' Cold
War with the atheist Communist Russia and was passed to
43 See Kmiec, supra note 7, at 313-14 (describing origins of Pledge of Allegiance); see
also Frain v. Baron, 307 F.Supp. 27, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (observing that "the pledge of
allegiance was written by Frances Bellamy, a Baptist minister, to be used at the Chicago
World's Fair Grounds in October, 1892, on the four hundredth anniversary of the
discovery of America"); cf. Emily D. Newhouse, I Pledge Allegiance to the Flag of the
United States of America: One Nation Under No God, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 383, 386
(2004) (noting that "Bellamy was an assistant editor of a periodical entitled The Youth's
Companion, in which the Pledge first appeared in print during the late 19th century").
44 Kmiec, supra note 7, at 313 (discussing Bellamy's intent for the Pledge).
45 See Thompson, supra note 37, at 564 (explaining codification of Pledge of
Allegiance); see also Newhouse, supra note 43, at 387 (stating that "as it was originally
codified, the Pledge did not include the words 'under God;' the Pledge would not be to 'one
Nation under God' until 1954 when Congress proposed an amendment adding the
words"); cf. Lewis v. Allen, 5 Misc.2d 68, 70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957) (observing case law
which points out that "one Nation indivisible" was codified by Congress).
46 See Kmiec, supra note 7, at 312 (discussing history of Pledge of Allegiance);
McKenzie, supra note 14, at 387-88 (describing circumstances in which Pledge of
Allegiance was formally recognized by Congress); see also Russo, supra note 10, at 303-05
(outlining development of Pledge of Allegiance).
47 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 88 (1985) (discussing alterations to Pledge of
Allegiance); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 439 n.5 (1962) (citing House Reports relating to
Pledge amendment); see also Nichols, supra note 5, at 810 (stating that Congress added
"under God" to Pledge of Allegiance in 1954).
48 See Collins, supra note 20, at 16 (noting addition of "under God"); Gey, supra note
20, at 1876 (stating that Congress added "under God" to Pledge of Allegiance in 1954); see
also Nichols, supra note 5, at 810 (discussing addition of "under God" to Pledge of
Allegiance).
49 H.R. REP. No. 83-1693, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N at 2340.
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polarize the United States from its Cold War adversary.50 At that
time, Senator Ferguson reaffirmed that "under the Constitution
no power is lodged anywhere to establish a religion"51 and
declared that this addition was "not an attempt to establish a
religion" but to recognize "God's province over the lives of our
people and over this great Nation."52
Scholars argue that the recognition of God is important to
maintain a balanced government, because acknowledgment of a
Supreme Being serves as a check and balance to the secular
state.5 3 Furthermore, in her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,
Justice O'Connor expressed the idea that certain governmentally
based references to God merely "[express] confidence in the
future, and [encourage] the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society."54
C. The Pledge of Allegiance as a Supreme Court Issue
The Pledge of Allegiance is not a stranger to the federal
courts.5 5 Even before the addition of "under God" to the Pledge of
Allegiance, the Supreme Court ruled on a challenge to the Pledge
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.56 In
Barnette, a Jehovah's Witness brought suit against the school
district from which his children were expelled pursuant to
regulations requiring students to recite the Pledge of
50 See Steven Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2118-21 (1996) (stating that purpose of amendment was to include
definitive factor of American life); Nichols, supra note 5, at 810 (suggesting that purpose
of amendment was to reflect revival of religiosity in American people); see also Thompson,
supra note 37, at 564 (noting purpose of amendment of Pledge of Allegiance).
51 H.R. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2341.
52 Id.
53 See Joseph Duncan, Jr., Privilege, Invisibility and Religion: A Critique of the
Privilege that Christianity Has Enjoyed in the United States, 54 ALA. L. REV. 617, 636
(2003) (suggesting that religion and government are commingled despite Establishment
Clause); Glenn Gordon, Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious
Displays, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 208 (1985) (observing that "in some situations, the
Court will tolerate government support of religion"); see also Kmiec, supra note 7, at 313
(discussing Rousseau's and Marx's view on God and secular state).
54 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55 See Myers v. Loudon County Sch. Bd., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266 (E.D.Va. 2003)
(citing previous claims contesting constitutionality of Pledge of Allegiance); Abner Greene,
The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451 (1995) (discussing case
barring public schools from compelling students to participate in Pledge of Allegiance); see
also Newhouse, supra note 43, at 406 (referring to Seventh Circuit decision concerning
constitutionality of Pledge of Allegiance under Establishment Clause).
56 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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Allegiance. 57 The Court held that such state action violates both
the FirstD8 and Fourteenth Amendments 59 and set the standard
for in-school recitation whereby no student thereafter could be
compelled to recite the Pledge. 60 There was, however, no mention
of whether a student could be compelled to observe respectful
silence during the Pledge of Allegiance. 61
The major problem with the Pledge reciting statute was that
the compelled speech proscribed therein is prohibited by the
Constitution. 62 The Court referred to the use of symbols such as
the flag or emblems to merely be a "shortcut to the mind"63 and
therefore subject to the First Amendment. The actions of the
government, in requiring Pledge recitation, were found to
"transcend constitutional limitations on their power and invade
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control."64 In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter examined the role
of judicial review, judges, and his desire to leave this issue up to
the voters, not the Court. 65 Justice Frankfurter viewed the case
to be a passing of judgment on State power and thereby outside
the role of the Court.66
57 See id. at 629-32 (presenting facts of case).
58 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
60 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633-44 (analyzing merits of case). See generally Marsha
C. Brilliant, Lee v. Weisman: The Establishment Clause: A Consideration of Its Protection
Against Allowing Prayer in Public Schools, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 1193, 1198 (1994)
(stating that persuading and compelling students to participate in religious exercise was
forbidden by Establishment Clause of First Amendment); Greene, supra note 55, at 452
(noting that Barnette Court held that public-school students could not be compelled to
recite the Pledge).
61 See Andonian, supra note 24, at 131 (noting that 1954 Act requires Pledge to be
recited at schools, but it does not require citizens to observe or even acknowledge Pledge);
Collins, supra note 20, at 38 (acknowledging that Court had missed opportunity to clarify
Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Greene, supra note 55, at 462 (declaring that
reasonable observer would not necessarily think that non-protesting student is
participating in prayer).
62 See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)
(discussing actions of State). See generally Nichols, supra note 5, at 821 (reiterating that
prayer endorsed religion and violated Establishment Clause); Trinh, supra note 14, at 807
(noting that the words "under God" are violation of Establishment Clause).
63 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632 (finding that use of flag symbolizes system or
institution).
64 See id. at 642 (affirming judgment enjoining enforcement of West Virginia
regulation).
65 See id. at 649 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing role of judges).
66 See id. at 653 (stating that the Constitution does not bar the state from carrying
out its official duties but for religious influence).
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The First Amendment - As Intended by the Framers of the
Constitution
The applicable portion of the First Amendment states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." Although
this clause has been the subject of continuous judicial scrutiny,67
the enduring interpretation of the clause has relied largely upon
determining "what history reveals was the contemporaneous
understanding of its guarantees."68  Therefore, the proper
application of the Establishment Clause requires an
understanding of what the Framers of the Constitution intended
it to demand. 69 It is also important to note that (as with the
entirety of the Bill of Rights), the Establishment Clause was not
intended to be a statute, but to state an objective. 70
An investigation into the purpose of the Establishment Clause
undoubtedly refers back to the early Americans' fear of bondage
from national churches in Europe. 71 More specifically, many
67 See Ashley M. Bell, "God Save This Honorable Court:" How Current Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled With the Secularization of Historical Religious
Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2001) (noting inconsistent Establishment
Clause jurisprudence); Eileen Kaufman, High Court in 1996-97: Establishment Clause,
Freedom of Speech and Takings, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19, 1997, at 1 (stating that speech
regulation under Establishment Clause is subject to the closest judicial scrutiny); Burt
Neuborne, Worship Takes a Back Pew, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 29, 1988, at 86 (discussing
shift from "pure effects" test to "modified effects" test which invites less judicial scrutiny
in Establishment Clause cases).
68 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
69 See D. Chris Albright, The Words "Under God" Do Not Render the Pledge of
Allegiance Unconstitutional, 11 NEV. LAW. 9 (2003) (discussing Framer's intentions for
First Amendment); Michael J. Gaynor, Faith of Our Fathers; History Teaches Us that Our
Constitution was Written to Support and Encourage Religious Belief, LEGAL TIMES, Nov.
24, 2003, at 50 (noting that Framers of the Constitution recognized their dependence on
God); Dahlia Lithwick, Thou Shalt Answer Important Questions: The U.S. Supreme Court
Should Stop Side-Stepping the Church-State Debate, TEX. LAW., Dec. 20, 2004, at 51
(posing the question of what Framers of the Constitution intended in terms of religion).
70 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 (discussing purpose of Establishment Clause); Matt
Ackerman, Teacher Upheld in Rejecting Bible Story in Public School, N.J.L.J., Jan. 19,
1998, at 4 (stating "[t]he purpose of the Establishment Clause is to stop the establishment
of a state religion, not to silence religious citizens"); Melissa Rogers, Court Defends
Religion from Risks of State, N.J.L.J., July 10, 2000, at 1 (explaining that Establishment
Clause was enacted to protect rights of members of minority religions).
71 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 8 (1947) (citing
historical implications of First Amendment); Lithwick, supra note 69, at 51 (noting that
history of Establishment Clause should be examined since some American law has its
roots in Napoleonic code); Alan Sears, Not a Religion-Free Land, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 2004,
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early Colonists and Settlers were Catholic dissenters of the
Church of England's hostile infringement upon their religious
beliefs. 72 European and American history is fraught with tragic
examples of religious persecution resulting from one's
indifference to a national church or religion. 73 Therefore, as
fellow dissenters, the Framers created the Establishment Clause
with the "inten[t] . . .to prohibit the designation of any church as
a 'national' one,"74 whereby there is "neither orthodoxy or
heterodoxy."7 5
A review of the events surrounding the passing of the Bill of
Rights exposes the large role played by James Madison. 76
Madison is credited with proposing the following words, which
eventually were revised to become the First Amendment Religion
Clauses: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of
religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in
any manner, or on any pretext, infringed."77 This language
demonstrates that Madison, "undoubtedly the most important
architect among the Members of the House of Amendments
which became the Bill of Rights,"78 intended the First
Amendment to serve as a means to prohibit the creation of any
national religion and inter-sect discrimination, not as requiring
at 35 (declaring that the phrase "separation of church and state" does not appear in the
history of the Constitution).
72 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8 (discussing Colonists); Joel Chineson, The Politics of
Enlightenment, AM. LAW., May 1994, at 46 (stating that writings of Jefferson and
Madison were influenced by Colonists); Joel Chineson, Do You Believe in God-Talk? The
Culture of Disbelief by Stephen L. Carter, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 21, 1994, at 50 (hereinafter
God-Talk) (noting that writings of influential presidents and columnists were influenced
by Colonists).
73 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-9 (referring to hardships faced due to religious
persecution); see also Dahlia Lithwick, High Court Should Seek Middle Ground in
Church-State Cases, RECORDER, Dec. 3, 2004, at 5 (hereinafter Middle Ground) (noting
that not seeking a middle ground in terms of religion could lead to a lifetime of religious
persecution); Lithwick, supra note 69, at 51 (stating that "honor thy father and mother"
will either turn their children into mad evangelicals or open the door to a lifetime of
religious persecution and ostracizing).
74 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75 See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (explaining that First Amendment "terminated disabilities"
and did not "create new privileges").
76 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92-93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing James
Madison).
77 See id. at 96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining origin of Religion Clauses).
78 See id. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting history of Bill of Rights).
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the government to behave in a strictly neutral manner towards
religion and irreligion. 79
B. Judicial Interpretation of Establishment Clause
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has treated
Constitutional challenges under three different theories:
separation, neutrality, and accommodation.8 0 This Note argues
that accommodation is the best approach and therefore should be
applied as the standard in analyzing challenges involving the
Establishment Clause.
1. Separation and its Use of the Mythical "Wall"
Justice Black first promulgated the erroneous separation
theory in Everson v. Bd. Of Educ. Of The Township of Ewing.8
In Everson, the Court held that public tax funds could be used to
fund the transportation of parochial school students.8 2 However,
even after upholding the use of public funds to transport children
to a religiously-based school, Justice Black went on to define the
Establishment Clause in light of the separation theory, whereby
"Neither a state nor a government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another."83
79 See id. at 98-99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing adoption of Bill of Rights);
see also William F. Cox, Jr., The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and Its
Application to Education, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 111, 124-25 (2001) (arguing that intent of
Framers to prohibit federal government from interfering in matters of religion referred to
limited situations and therefore allowed actions that would protect or promote religion);
Zachary N. Somers, The Mythical Wall of Separation: How the Supreme Court has
Amended the Constitution, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 265, 274 (2004) (stating that Madison
did not actually intend strict separation of church and state as previously thought).
80 See Arnold H. Loewy, The Positive Reality and Normative Virtues of a "Neutral"
Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 533, 533-42 (2003) (analyzing theories of
separation, accommodation, and neutrality); David Felsen, Developments in Approaches to
Establishment Clause Analysis: Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 395, 400-13
(1989) (discussing three major interpretations of Establishment Clause). See generally
Gregory A. Horowitz, Accommodation and Neutrality Under the Establishment Clause:
The Foster Care Challenge, 98 YALE L.J. 617 (1989) (comparing Establishment Clause
doctrines of accommodation and neutrality).
81 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
82 See id. at 17 (stating holding of case); see also Albright, supra note 69, at 9 n.4
(presenting court's ruling); Wanda I. Otero-Ziegler, The Remains of the Wall: From
Everson v. Board of Education to Strout v. Albanese and Beyond, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 207 (2000) (analyzing holding of Everson case).
83 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
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Perhaps the incongruent analysis and holding of Everson is
telling, for it demonstrates that the theory of separation is not
only inaccurate, but also impossible. 84 Various courts have since
struck down the separation theory, citing that no societal
segment nor institution can "exist in a vacuum .... Nor does the
Constitution require complete separation of church and state."85
An investigation into our Nation's historical formation
demonstrates the pervasive recognition and appreciation of a
Supreme Being throughout our government.8 6 Such allusions
include: the mention of God in the Declaration of Independence,8 7
the use of a Bible to swear in the President, 88 President
Washington's establishment of a day of Thanksgiving to give
thanks for God's gifts,8 9 the phrase "In God We Trust" on our
84 See Loewy, supra note 79, at 534-35 (discussing separation); see also Felsen, supra
note 80, at 404-05 (stating that separation doctrine is unrealistic); Horowitz, supra note
80, at 617-18 (acknowledging that Supreme Court quickly realized that the separation
doctrine is impractical).
85 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
86 See Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination
of Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian
Religion in the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927, 928-30 (1996) (stating
that most public documents prior to adoption of the Constitution made reference to God);
see also Newhouse, supra note 43, at 389-90 (noting that House of Representatives
approved a resolution to establish "a day of Thanksgiving and prayer" the day after
adoption of First Amendment); Laura Zwi, The Politics of Toleration: The Establishment
Clause and the Act of Toleration Examined, 66 IND. L.J. 773, 792 (1991) (discussing
repeated reference of the Federalist and the Continental Congress to God).
87 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1, 2, 32 (U.S. 1776) (acknowledging
existence of a supreme diety in the following instances: (1) preamble speaks of "Nature's
God," (2) second paragraph states that "all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights," and (3) final paragraph makes a
reference to the "Supreme Judge of the world" and "divine Providence").
88 See Sherman J. Clar, The Scholarship Of Sanford Levinson: Promise, Prayer, And
Identity, 38 TULSA L. REV. 579, 591 (2003) (noting that presidents and jurors must swear
to Bible); David M. Smolin, The Religious Voice in the Public Square: Cracks in the
Mirrored Prison: An Evangelical Critique of Secularist Academic and Judicial Myths
Regarding the Relationship of Religion and American Politics, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1487,
1501 (1996) (discussing contradiction between President's oath to the Bible at
inauguration and prohibition of prayer in public schools); see also Vic Snyder, You've
Taken an Oath to Support the Constitution, Now What? The Constitutional Requirement
for a Congressional Oath of Office, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 897, 901-02 (2001)
(describing ceremony of the President's oath).
89 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2317-18 (2004)
(noting Washington's Bible references during his inauguration and his later
establishment of Thanksgiving); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 635-36 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (mentioning President Washington's proclamation of "national celebration of
Thanksgiving"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675 (stating that since President Washington's
founding of Thanksgiving as a national holiday, Thanksgiving "has not lost its theme of
expressing thanks for Divine aid any more than has Christmas lost its religious
significance").
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coinage, 90 and the Supreme Court's invocation of God's guidance
before commencing judicial proceedings. 91 Such treatment belies
separation, which requires the elimination of any connection
between government and religion.92
In reality, separation is impractical, mainly because the United
States government is concerned with general public welfare and
the funding of entities. 93 As applied, strict separation would
require the withholding of benefits and funding to all religious
groups. 94 Also, a strict application of the separation concept
would mandate that churches, as separated from the state, would
not even be eligible for the protection from municipal police and
fire companies. 95 This exclusion of religious groups from funding
and governmental privileges is exactly the sort of "callous
90 See Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2318 (explaining that "In God We Trust" has been on
every U.S. coin since 1938 and subsequently appeared on paper currency); Lynch, 465
U.S. at 676 (outlining specific references to religion, including the slogan "In God We
Trust" on our nation's coinage); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 440 n.5 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (highlighting process by which "In God We Trust" became mandatory on
United States coinage and ultimately became the nation's motto).
91 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 632-46 (criticizing separation theory); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 675-677 (1984) (citing government allusions to God); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (stating that "[tihe opening of sessions of legislative and other
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of
this country").
92 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1961) (reviewing implications of
Establishment Clause on church and state relations); Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues and
Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 285, 292 (1999) (declaring that separation between church and
state aims to "keep these two centers of authority-God and Caesar, so to speak-within
their respective spheres of competence"); Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of
the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1071-72 (2002) (discussing conflicting
values regarding Establishment Clause).
93 See Esbeck, supra note 92, at 290 (maintaining that high governmental taxes and
regulation resulted in "a near monopoly over the resources available for social welfare
spending"); Gedicks, supra note 92, at 1088 (commenting on unsatisfactory application of
strict separation); Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal Development Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513,
515 (1968) (announcing significant state involvement in "allocating resources and actively
structuring social order").
94 See Esbeck, supra note 92, at 290 (emphasizing that "[no-aid separationism
demands that religious ministries either secularize and thereby qualify for government
aid, or close their doors for lack of funding"); Gedicks, supra note 92, at 1088 (criticizing
separation); Giannella, supra note 92, at 515 (arguing that heightened state involvement
in distributing resources raises an issue of whether to provide benefits to religious
groups).
95 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (concluding that strict separation
prevents municipalities from rendering police and fire safety to religious groups); O'Hair
v. Paine, 312 F. Supp. 434, 438 (W.D. Tx. 1969) (restating effect of strict separation on
protection available for religious groups); Marsa v. Wernik, 163 N.J. Super. 589, 592 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) (reiterating consequences of separation of church and state).
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indifference" 96 that the Court has found to be contrary to the
Establishment Clause. 97
In Everson, Justice Black inappropriately alluded to Thomas
Jefferson's "wall of separation between church and state"
metaphor as supporting the separation theory.9 8 Thomas
Jefferson's "misleading metaphor"99 has frequently been the
subject of criticism for its application to the Establishment
Clause.lOO The phrase "wall of separation" is not mentioned
anywhere in the Constitution of the United States but has
nevertheless been applied as constitutional doctrine in analyzing
First Amendment issues.101 In order to explain the mythical
nature of the "wall of separation," it is necessary to examine its
author and its improper permeation of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
At the time the First Amendment was drafted, Thomas
Jefferson was in France and therefore did not play any part in its
drafting.102 The actual phrase "wall of separation" was extracted
from a courtesy letter Jefferson wrote to the Danbury Baptist
Association in response to a discussion nearly fourteen years
96 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314.
97 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 472-73 (1962) (disqualifying separation as
reflecting intent of Establishment Clause); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (acknowledging that
Establishment Clause does not compel a "callous indifference" to religious organizations);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (recognizing that "callous indifference" is not
required by Establishment Clause).
98 See Everson v. Bd. Of Educ. of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)
(stating Jefferson's Establishment Clause beliefs).
99 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 93-95 (disqualifying Jefferson's "Wall of Separation" as
unsound constitutional doctrine); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948)
(Reed, J., dissenting) (stating that Establishment Clause cases should not be decided
according to Jefferson's figure of speech); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (commenting on misapplication of Jefferson's metaphor to Establishment
Clause cases).
101 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (relying on Jefferson's "wall of separation" in
holding local school's prayer unconstitutional); Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164-66
(1879) (applying Jefferson's metaphor in deciding Establishment Clause case). See
generally School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (using statements of Jefferson and other Framers in evaluating
Establishment Clause issues).
102 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163 (noting Jefferson's presence in France during
drafting of the First Amendment); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(commenting on application of "wall" metaphor to Establishment Clause); see also John S.
Baker, Jr., The Religion Clauses: Since the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court Has Chartered
an Inconsistent Course that Sometimes Does, and Sometimes Does Not, Apply Strict
Separation of Church and State, WORLD AND I, Jan. 1, 2004, at 20 (discussing original
meaning of religion clauses).
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after the Congress enacted the Amendments. 103 It is nevertheless
unlikely, however, that strict separation was the goal of a man
who, in both of his inaugural addresses, acknowledged the need
for divine guidance and rested assurance in "the guardianship
and guidance of that Almighty Being whose power regulates the
destiny of nations ... and to whom we are bound to address our
devout gratitude for the past, as well as our fervent supplications
and best hopes for the future."104
Various Courts have affirmatively discredited the application
of the "wall" metaphor in Establishment Clause cases.105 Justice
Rehnquist referred to the use of Jefferson's metaphor as
constitutional doctrine as a "mistaken understanding of
Constitutional history."106 Justice Rehnquist's insightful dissent
in Wallace adamantly rejects the use of the "wall" metaphor in
Constitutional disputes, suggesting that "It should be frankly
and explicitly abandoned." 107 Moreover, in rejecting the "wall"
metaphor Justice Rehnquist quotes Benjamin Cardozo's
observation that "metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched,
for starting as devices to liberate thought, they often end by
enslaving it."108
2. Neutrality
The erroneous theory of neutrality can be attributed to the
Court's holding in School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp,109 where the Court held that a Pennsylvania statute
requiring Biblical readings at the opening of each school day was
103 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (attributing "wall" metaphor to Jefferson's letter to
Danbury Baptist Association); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(explaining history of Jefferson's "wall" metaphor); see also Daniel L. Dreisbach & John D.
Whaley, What the Wall Separates: A Debate on Thomas Jefferson's 'Wall of Separation"
Metaphor, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 627, 627-28 (1999) (analyzing Jefferson's metaphor as
written to Danbury Baptist Association).
104 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 634 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Inaugural
Addresses of the Presidents of the United States, S. Doc. 101-10, p. 28 (1989)).
105 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (stating that "wall" metaphor is
not wholly accurate); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's
application of "wall of separation" to Establishment Clause cases); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 312-15 (1952) (noting that First Amendment does not mandate complete
separation between Church and State).
106 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 107.
108 Id. (quoting Berkey v. Third Avenue R. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94 (1926)).
109 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
2005]
146 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:1
an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause.11o
Justice Clark called for "wholesome neutrality" to be maintained,
whereby "there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."ll'
Neutrality was also the preferred theory used by the Court in
Wallace v. Jaffree,1l2 where the Court struck down a school
moment of silence law (found to effectively foster mandatory
prayer) as inconsistent with the "government [practicing] a
course of complete neutrality toward religion."11 3 Although the
Court properly reasons that the First Amendment "freedom of
conscience" additionally "embraces the right to select any religion
or none at all,"l14 it errs in holding that this freedom can only be
upheld by applying the theory of neutrality."l5 Contrary to the
reasoning of the Wallace majority, neutrality does not simply
enable citizens freedom of conscience; it dangerously borders on
the possibility of promoting hostility towards those who have
conscientiously chosen religion over non-religion.l1 6
The neutrality theory is improper for numerous reasons, most
especially for its potential to foster hostility toward religion.ll 7
As noted by various courts, hostility against religion is just as
severely prohibited by the Constitution as an outright
110 See id. at 205 (stating holding of case).
111 Id. at 222.
112 471 U.S. 38 (1985).
113 Id. at 60.
114 Id. at 53.
115 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 86 (1985) (Burger, J., dissenting) (invalidating
application of neutrality theory); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (suggesting blind deference
to neutrality could foster passivity or hostility toward religion). See generally Bd. of Educ.
of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (admitting Establishment Clause "cannot be easily reduced to a single test").
116 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (warning application of
neutrality to Establishment Clause may have dangerous repercussions); see also Thomas
C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 724 (1997) (positing
enforcement of neutrality standard will lead to "active suppression" of religion, moral
truths and insight into human nature). See generally Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
313-15 (1952) (discussing importance of not favoring secular values over religious beliefs
or religious beliefs over secular values).
117 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (criticizing neutrality and
fear of hostility); see also Berg, supra note 115, at 724 (cautioning neutrality may
dangerously suppress religious and moral discourse). See generally William A. Galston,
Expressive Liberty and Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Freedom of Conscience, 48
AM. J. JURIS. 149, 175 (2003) (discussing neutrality's effect of either favoring or inhibiting
free expression of religious belief).
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establishment of religion.118  Chief Justice Rehnquist has
disqualified the theory of neutrality on multiple occasions, noting
that "nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government
to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion."119 As
mandated by Constitutional law theory, the interpretation of the
Constitution must not deviate from the original intentions of the
Framers.120  To act otherwise will "lead to the type of
unprincipled decision-making that has plagued our
Establishment Clause cases." 121 Chief Justice Rehnquist further
rejects neutrality by reasoning that the principle is properly
applied only in First Amendment speech cases, where it is used
to determine when courts should apply strict scrutiny.122
Reviewing the objective of the Establishment Clause offers
additional evidence of the inapplicability of neutrality.123
Whereas neutrality calls for impartial treatment of all religions
as well as irreligion, the Establishment Clause merely aims to
"prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should
118 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 85-86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (objecting to majority's
holding); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasizing
Constitution proscribes hostility toward religion). See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (noting Establishment Clause meant to prohibit
punishment for religious belief).
119 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (adding Framer's drafted
Establishment Clause with intent to prevent national religion and domination of one
religious sect over others).
120 See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 176 (1973) (emphasizing Constitution must
be interpreted in light of law and principles known to Framers); see also U.S. Term Limits
v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 832 (1995) (refusing to interpret constitution as against framer's
intent). See generally Kelly A. MacGrady and John W. Van Doren, AALS Constitutional
Law Panel on Brown, Another Council of Nicaea?, 35 AKRON L. REV. 371, 386 (2002)
(summarizing originalist view of constitutional interpretation whereby interpretation
should closely adhere to framer's intent).
121 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (reinforcing
importance of strict contract interpretation according to Framer's intent).
122 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 325 (2000) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (refuting Court's application of neutrality); see also Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (applying neutrality principle to review loudness of
speech in public forums and exemplifying Rehnquist's point); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
320 (1988) (reviewing regulations against picketing under neutrality and further
bolstering Rehnquist's position).
123 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 728 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that neutrality is at odds with Establishment Clause goal of social concord); see
also Gedicks, supra note 92, at 1100 (arguing that Establishment Clause protects
fundamental value of separation of church and state while neutrality only ensures equal
treatment of religion and social welfare). See generally Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred
Standards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred
Sites, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 1291, 1305-06 (1996) (suggesting neutrality not sole concern under
Establishment Clause and adding government cannot favor non-religion over religion
even if it does so evenhandedly).
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give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national
government."124 A straight comparison of these two objectives
exposes the over-burdensome nature of neutrality.125
3. Accommodation: The Proper Analytical Route
In upholding the public school practice of early dismissal for
students attending religion classes outside of school, the Court in
Zorach v. Clauson126 found the proper analysis of the
Establishment Clause to be the accommodation theory.127 The
Court interpreted the Establishment Clause as requiring the
government to "[respect] the religious nature of our people and
[accommodate] the public service to their spiritual needs"
because "[anything else] would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to
religious groups."128
The Court in Lynch v. Donnelly also applied the
accommodation theory in finding that the city's display of a
creche was not a violation of the Establishment Clause.129 Chief
Justice Burger appropriately reasoned that the deciding of an
Establishment Clause case requires a "[reconciliation of] the
inescapable tension between the objective of preventing
unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state upon the
124 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (quoting Story, J.).
125 See Gedicks, supra note 92, at 1100 (positing satisfaction of neutrality principle
does not ensure compliance with Establishment Clause); see also Steven K. Green, Of
(Un)Equal Jurisprudence: Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality and
Separationism, 43 B.C.L. REV. 1111, 1136 (2002) (arguing neutrality, especially in
religious funding cases, has anti-Establishment Clause effects such as government
attribution of religious messages and dependency of religious entities on government). See
generally Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad
Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 573 (2004)
(criticizing neutrality as an "empty concept" and positing there is no neutral baseline from
which to gauge claims of neutrality).
126 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
127 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1952) (establishing accommodation
as proper approach); Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578, 617 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing implication by the Court that accommodation of religion is desirable); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992) (noting that accommodation is proper approach to
Establishment Clause questions).
128 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 (setting forth holding of the Court).
129 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 667-88 (holding that display did not violate
Establishment Clause); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 323
(2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Lynch for proposition that the Constitution
mandates governmental accommodation for religion, not merely tolerance of different
religion); Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1254 (2000) (noting
that Lynch states that there is an affirmative duty to accommodate religion under the
Establishment Clause).
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other, and the reality that, as the Court has so often noted, total
separation of the two is not possible."130 In effectively reconciling
this tension, the Court applied the constitutionally mandated
accommodation theory, not hostility, towards religion.131
Accommodation is also verified by the United States' historic
tradition of prayer.132 As previously noted, throughout American
history, society and government have embraced references to
God.133 Numerous Supreme Court Justices have even recognized
these references as benign.134 This pervasive embrace of religion
from the founding of the United States until the present day
clearly demonstrates that the Establishment Clause was
intended to accommodate religion.135 Moreover, it reveals that
the Religion Clauses were "not designed to drive religious
expression out of public thought; they were written to avoid
discrimination."13 6 In keeping with this design, accommodation
clearly poses no threat to religious and non-religious liberty.
130 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672 (stating that the Court has consistently recognized that
there cannot be complete separation between state and religion).
131 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (discussing permissible accommodation under the
Establishment Clause); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 323 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (noting
that Lynch decision utilized accommodation theory to determine the validity of the
display); Tangipahoa, 530 U.S. at 1254 (citing Lynch for position that accommodation is
required under the Constitution).
132 See Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 672 (1989) (stating
that there are accommodations within House and Senate Chambers for Members of
Congress to be able to pray while at work); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (referring to mention of God in government practices); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at
323 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (noting that there is nothing in the Constitution to
prevent public school students from praying at any time during school).
133 See Duncan, supra note 53, at 618 (stating that despite the Constitutional
guarantee of separation between church and state, Christianity is pervasive in public
life); H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There be Peaceful Coexistence of
Religion with the Secular State?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 203, 203-04 (1999) (quoting President
John Quincy Adams and discussing close ties between government and religion in early
American life); Kmiec, supra note 7, at 307-10 (noting religious references throughout
American politics).
134 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 672 (asserting that religion is so pervasive in American
life that federal government has acted in order to accommodate federal lawmakers desire
to pray close to the floor); Lee, 505 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
mentioning religion is common in United States governmental functions); Newdow v. U.S.
Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fernandez, C.J., dissenting) (citing religious
references).
135 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (promoting propriety of
accommodation). See generally, Duncan, supra note 53, at 618 (discussing privileged
position that Christianity has enjoyed in America); House, supra note 133, at 204 (noting
historical connection between Christianity and United States government which has
existed since the Nation's founding).
136 Newdow, 292 F.3d at 613 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (explaining that religion
clauses were not supposed to stamp out all religion, but rather to prevent establishment
of an official, national religion).
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This is further evidenced by the United States' continuous
growth as a religiously diverse nation inhabited by numerous
religious sects, including non-believers.137
C. The Three Tests as Applied by the Ninth Circuit
Although the Court has cited the terms "separation,"
"neutrality," and "accommodation" in First Amendment cases,
Establishment Clause cases have typically applied each of the
three different tests.138 As the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Newdow was based upon the application of all three tests, the
following overview and discussion in light of the Newdow
decision serves to facilitate an understanding of exactly where
the majority in Newdow went wrong in applying the tests to the
Pledge of Allegiance.
1. The Lemon v. Kurtzman Test
In holding that granting state aid to non-public schools was
unconstitutional, the court in Lemon formulated a three part test
for assessing possible Establishment Clause violations.139 In
order to be constitutionally sound, the government conduct must
"[flirst... have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally the statute must not foster 'an excessive
137 See id. at 614 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (noting that phrases such as "In God We
Trust" have not caused any harm upon religious liberties); see also Albright, supra note
69, at 9 (establishing that religious diversity has not diminished as result of Pledge of
Allegiance amendment to include "under God"). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifty-
Seventh Cleveland-Marshall Lecture: The Bill of Rights and Our Posterity, 42 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 573, 578 (1994) (recognizing that "America is and always has been a religiously
diverse nation - and religious liberty is among the most prized jewels of the American
Constitution").
138 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (indicating desire for complete
neutrality in religious matters); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-315 (1952)
(establishing accommodation approach); Everson v. Bd. Of Educ. Of The Township of
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (supporting separation theory).
139 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 612-13 (establishing framework for Establishment
Clause violations); see also Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A
Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REV. 551, 591 (1998) (recognizing that "[iun
1971, the Supreme Court established its well-known three part test in Lemon v.
Kurtzman"); Joseph P. Viteritti, A Truly Living Constitution: Why Educational
Opportunity Trumps Strict Separation on the Voucher Question, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 89, 103 (2000) (explaining that Lemon Court "set down a three-part test designed
to determine when interaction between government and religious institutions violates the
Establishment Clause").
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government entanglement with religion."'140 The Ninth Circuit
improperly found that the 1954 Act violated the second prong,
holding that the legislation effectively promoted religion when it
amended the Pledge of Allegiance to include "under God."141 This
analysis is incorrect, as Congressional records and Supreme
Court dicta demonstrates, the Pledge of Allegiance and its "under
God" phraseology is not a religious activity, but an act of patriotic
expression. 142
2. The "Endorsement Test" from Lynch v. Donnelly
The "endorsement" test was suggested by Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Lynch as a "clarification" of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 143 More specifically, the endorsement test
interprets the Establishment Clause as "[prohibiting]
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person's standing in the political community."144 Justice
O'Connor also cited two ways in which government action fails
the test, namely "excessive entanglement with religious
institutions" and "government endorsement or disapproval of
religion."145 In applying this test, the Ninth Circuit found that
the reference in the Pledge to "God" professed a belief in
monotheism and thereby violated government neutrality because
it affirmed belief in the existence of God.146 Once again, this
140 Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 612-13 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
141 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 610 (applying purpose prong to Pledge of Allegiance); see
also Brett G. Scharffs, Foundations of Church Autonomy: The Autonomy of Church and
State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217, 1338 (2004) (analyzing Court's holding in Newdow
regarding the purpose of Pledge of Allegiance); Trinh, supra note 14, at 830 (concluding
that Ninth Circuit "was incorrect to hold that the Pledge was coercive in nature").
142 See Kmiec, supra note 7, at 312-13 (disagreeing with Ninth Circuit's holding); see
also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984) (including the Pledge of Allegiance,
"recited by many thousands of public school children - and adults - every year," among
examples of references to religious heritage that, like the celebration of Thanksgiving, are
secular and patriotic); Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 631
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that certain practices, despite religious roots,
are now "generally understood as a celebration of patriotic values rather than particular
religious beliefs").
143 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying
Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
144 Id. at 688 (reviewing fundamental prohibitions of Establishment Clause).
145 Id. (identifying governmental endorsement or disapproval as the "more direct" of
the two categories).
146 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607-08 (applying endorsement test); see also Thompson,
supra note 37, at 566 (understanding Ninth Circuit as holding that "the Pledge takes a
position with regard to a fundamental religious question, whether God exists, in
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holding was improperly based upon a distorted interpretation of
the purpose of the Pledge as a religious act. It is even recognized
within the origin of school prayer cases, Engel v. Vitale, that the
holding therein is not "inconsistent with the fact that [people] are
officially encouraged to express love for our country by reciting
historical documents ... which contain references to the Deity or
... with the fact that there are many manifestations in our
public life of belief in God."147
3. The "Coercion Test" from Lee v. Weisman148
In determining that the invitation of clergy members to offer
prayers at public school graduation violated the Establishment
Clause, the Court in Lee formulated the "coercion" test.149 An
action fails this test if it is found that "citizens are subjected to
state-sponsored religious exercises, [whereby] the State disavows
its own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable
conscience and belief which is the mark of a free people."150
Consistent with the facts of Lee, the concentration in Newdow
was on the special risk of "indirect coercion" that occurs with
young school children, where there is a fear of the "[imposition]
upon schoolchildren [of] the ... unacceptable choice between
participating and protesting."151 Again, the Ninth Circuit
improperly applied this test to the Pledge of Allegiance because it
inequitably compared outright prayer to the recitation of a
patriotic statement. 152 On the contrary, the reference to "God" in
contravention of the principle of government neutrality toward religion"); Clay Calvert &
Robert D. Richards, Defending the First in the Ninth: Judge Alex Kozinski and the
Freedoms of Speech and Press, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 259, 290 (2003) (observing that
Ninth Circuit held, in Newdow, that "the reference to a single 'God' was tantamount to
endorsing monotheism as the national religious preference").
147 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962) (acknowledging references to a
single God in many cultural documents).
148 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
149 See id. at 592 (explaining coercion test); see also Eric Fleetham, Lee v. Weisman:
Psychological Coercion Offends the Traditional Notion of Coercion Under the
Establishment Clause, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 725, 725-26 (1993) (highlighting that "[als
recommended by many scholars, the Court replaced the tripartite Lemon test with a
coercion test"). See generally Brook Millard, Lee v. Weisman and the Majoritarian
Implications of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 71 DENV. U.L. REV. 759 (1994)
(noting that, in Lee, the court abandoned three-prong Lemon test in favor of new coercion
standard).
150 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
151 See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F,3d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 2002).
152 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 613 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
majority about coercive effect of Pledge of Allegiance); see also Kmiec, supra note 7, at 312
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the Pledge does not disqualify the recitation of the Pledge from
being a purely patriotic act.1 53
III. PROPERLY APPLYING THE LEMON, ENDORSEMENT, AND
COERCION TESTS WITHIN THE ACCOMMODATION THEORY TO
NEWDOWWOULD HAVE ULTIMATELY ACHIEVED THE PROPER
RESULT IN THE SUPREME COURT.
The Supreme Court was not likely to have agreed with the
arguments set forth by Newdow. On numerous occasions,1 54
Supreme Court Justices have reflected in dicta upon the
constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance and have noted that
the Pledge is not a prayer and is thereby constitutionally
sound. 155  In addition, an analysis of Supreme Court
Establishment Clause jurisprudence provides a broad spectrum
of behavior that the Court has upheld, which is much more
(proffering that "[tihe dissent in Newdow 11 does an admirable job of illustrating not only
that the pledge is not a religious act, but also how that fact puts it outside the discussion
of the Court's school prayer cases"). See generally Walter Lynch, "Under God" Does Not
Need to be Placed Under Wraps: The Phrase "Under God" Used in the Pledge of Allegiance
is Not an Impermissible Recognition of Religion, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 647, 660 (2004)
(positing that Newdow court improperly reasoned that the phrase "under God" in the
Pledge is a profession of a religious belief and further noting that the phrase merely
serves as a "description of the undeniable historical significance of religion in the
founding of the Republic").
153 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 614 (determining that Pledge of Allegiance is not a
religious act); see also Thompson, supra note 37, at 563 (commenting that Pledge of
Allegiance is a "patriotic ritual" and that "most Americans had probably never considered
that the routine recitation of the Pledge in the public schools might violate the
Constitution's prohibition on government establishments of religion"). But see Berg, supra
note 116, at 46-47 (positing that although the dissent in Newdow argues that Pledge of
Allegiance is a purely patriotic act, "the person reciting the Pledge, the panel majority
said, is making a series of affirmations, expressing belief in each value and proposition,
including that there is a God above the nation").
154 See School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963)
(highlighting that "the reference to divinity in the revised pledge of allegiance ... may
merely recognize the historical fact that our Nation was believed to have been founded
,under God' and is therefore not a religious exercise"); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716
(Brennan, J., concurring) (positing that "the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can best be
understood ... as a form a "ceremonial deism," protected from Establishment Clause
scrutiny"). See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962) (proffering that
"school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our country by
reciting historical documents... which contain references to the Deity or by singing
officially espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a
Supreme Being').
155 See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 614 (Fernandez, C.J., dissenting) (commenting on dicta
regarding Pledge of Allegiance); see also Thompson, supra note 37, at 568 (noting that
"Judge Fernandez pointed to relevant dicta in five Supreme Court cases" to demonstrate
that religious language in Pledge of Allegiance is so miniscule that it can not rationally be
regarded as a prayer). See generally Kmiec, supra note 7, at 312 (citing views on Pledge of
Allegiance).
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religiously centered than the Pledge of Allegiance. 156 It is clear
that a rote expression, such as the Pledge, is much less of an
expression or evidence of an attempt at governmental
establishment of a religion.157
In the foundational school prayer case, Engel v. Vitale held
that the school policy requiring daily invocation of God's blessing
in classrooms was a religious activity that violated the
Establishment Clause.158 In Engel, the defendant Board of
Education mandated that the following prayer be said aloud at
the commencement of the school day: "Almighty God, we
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country."159
The parents of ten students brought suit in response to this daily
prayer recitation, citing its violation of the First Amendment of
the Constitution.160 The Court agreed with the parents and held
156 See Albright, supra not 69, at 13 (suggesting that previous Establishment Clause
decisions do not provide that Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional); see also Douglas
Laylock, Theological Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:
Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARv. L. REV. 155, 223 (2004)
(highlighting that "the Justices have always assumed that some modest degree of
government-sponsored religious observance is permissible" and that repeated dicta by the
Court suggests that it "would not invalidate 'In God We Trust' on the currency,
presidential Thanksgiving Day proclamations, or the opening invocation at the Court's
own sessions: 'God save the United States and this honorable Court"'). See generally
Alexandra D. Furth, Secular Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Secularization System, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 579-80 (1998) (positing that
Supreme Court has engaged in a pattern of justifying several state sponsored religious
displays by concluding that they have lost any true religious significance).
157 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 717 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(highlighting that "references [such as the Pledge of Allegiance] are uniquely suited to
serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring
commitment to meet some national challenge"); see also Thompson, supra note 37, at 576-
78 (discussing arguments against Newdow). But see Laylock, supra note 156, at 224
(positing that "[t]o recite that the nation is 'under God' is inherently a religious
affirmation" and that "[t]he politicians who added 'under God' to the Pledge openly
announced their religious purposes, including religious indoctrination of the nation's
children").
158 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435-36 (1962) (holding that while children are
encouraged to express love for United States, often through recitation of documents that
contain reference to the deity, official prayer in school violates Establishment Clause, no
matter how brief); see also John D. Thompson, Student Religious Groups and the Right of
Access to Public School Activity Periods, 74 GEO. L.J. 205 (1985) (noting that, in Engel,
"the Court struck down state policies that provided for voluntary student participation in
school sponsored religious exercises at the beginning of each school day"). See generally
Matthew D. Donovan, Religion, Neutrality and the Public School Curriculum: Equal
Treatment or Separation, 43 CATH. LAW. 187, 190 (2004) (highlighting that Engel Court
"established a standard of neutrality forbidding any law, the "purpose and a primary
effect" of which amounts to "the advancement or inhibition of religion").
159 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 422.
160 See id. at 424 (discussing facts of case).
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that the use of the public school system to promote the narration
of a prayer was "wholly inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause."161
During its discussion, the Court noted that the Framers of the
Constitution wrote the First Amendment to "quiet well-justified
fears which nearly all of them felt arising out of an awareness
that governments of the past had shackled men's tongues to
make them speak only the religious thoughts that government
wanted them to speak and pray only to the God that government
wanted them to pray to."162 Then, the Court in Engel purposely
distinguished invalid school prayer from recitation of the Pledge
of Allegiance, noting that "[t]here is nothing in the decision
reached here that is inconsistent with the fact that children and
others are ... encouraged to express love for our country by
reciting historical documents.., which contain references to the
Deity .... Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true.
resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise [here]."163 To
further emphasize the removal of deific references from the
holding of this case, the Court also noted the significance of
religion in the United States and noted that the histories of both
are "inseparable."164
As previously suggested in Part III, the Supreme Court's
proper application of the Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests
would have resulted in the reversal of the Ninth Circuit's
Newdow judgment. Although the Ninth Circuit properly defined
all of the tests, the court incorrectly framed the purpose behind
the Pledge of Allegiance, bringing about an improper result.165
Moreover, the accommodation theory clearly promotes practices
such as the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.166
161 Id.
162 Id. at 435.
163 Id. at 435 n.21.
164 Id. at 434 (stating "[tihe history of man is inseparable from the history of
religion").
165 See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d. 466, 478 (Newdow II) (O'Scannlain, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Pledge is not a religious act); Bill W. Sanford, Jr., Separation v.
Patriotism: Expelling the Pledge From School, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 461, 465 (2003) (noting
that purposes of Pledge include denouncing atheism and communism); see also Kmiec,
supra note 7, at 311-15 (discussing Newdow I).
166 See Albright, supra note 69, at 9-14 (arguing that Pledge remains constitutionally
sound); see also Sanford, supra note 165, at 475-76 (noting that "mere accommodation by
the government of a particular religion or practice does not invalidate that action;" rather,
"accommodating religious beliefs follows the best of our traditions so long as the
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It is interesting to note that, even if the Pledge was religiously
oriented, it could possibly survive under the accommodation
theory. Pledge recitation is consistent with the view taken in
Zorach, that there is "no constitutional requirement which makes
it necessary for government to be hostile to religion" and holding
otherwise would be to "[prefer] those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe."167 If it were to strike down the
Pledge, the Court would, theoretically, be discriminating against
religion.
CONCLUSION
The study and interpretation of Constitutional law requires a
thorough inspection of the intentions of its Framers.168 The
errors made by the Ninth Circuit in Newdow expose improper
Constitutional analysis. The court not only misinterpreted the
purpose behind the Establishment Clause, but also failed to
properly understand the intentions and meaning of the Pledge of
Allegiance as a means to promote patriotism.169 Nevertheless,
the Court has held before and will continue to uphold the fact
that "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being."170 Although Newdow's day in Court was denied
due to his lack of standing, similar cases will surely follow which
will allow the Court to correctly interpret the Establishment
Clause and its proper application to the Pledge's "under God"
language.
accommodation extends to all faiths with 'hostility toward none.' Here, Pledge recitation
supports no hostility but merely accommodates the belief that a majority of Americans
follow"). See generally Gordon, supra note 53, at 187 (explaining accommodationists
believe that Establishment Clause was intended to prevent government from favoring one
sect over another, not forbid neutral government support for religion as a whole).
167 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
168 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(discussing proper Constitutional interpretation). See generally Boris I. Bittker,
Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 22-37 (1995) (critiquing originalism); David A. Strauss,
Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003)
(analyzing relevance of Framers' intent in interpreting Constitution).
169 See Gordon, supra note 53, at 187 (arguing purpose of establishment clause is to
prevent government from favoring one sect over another); Thompson, supra note 37, at
594 (noting purpose of Pledge is to promote patriotism). See generally Newdow II, 328
F.3d at 471-82 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's analysis).
170 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.
